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ABSTRACT 
The risk profile of a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project affects its debt service ability. In particular, the 
total risk profile of an oil and gas project is heavily influenced by its environmental risk exposure. However, 
this risk is often not given a considerable weight in risk analysis, resulting in underestimation of project’s 
total riskiness and consequent overestimation of the debt capacity. This study is aimed at understanding the 
dependence of the capital structure of oil and gas BOT projects on environmental risk exposure and 
proposes a methodology for incorporating such important risk into the total risk rating process to determine 
the debt leverage. As a result, it is shown that integrating environmental risks into the risk score of a project 
yields higher values of risk exposure, which may lead to a lower debt-to-equity ratio. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Project Financing (PF) has emerged as a distinct 
way of funding large international high risk projects and 
has undergone a drastic growth over the last decades. 
Under the terms of a PF mechanism, one or more 
investors join a separate legal entity, often called Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV), to finance design, construction, 
operations and maintenance of an infrastructure for a 
specified government-granted concession period. The 
initial investment, funded by means of both equity and 
debt sources, is intended to be recovered through 
revenues from the service provided during the 
concession period, which is determined to sufficiently 
pay off the debt incurred and earn an acceptable profit 
from the project cash flows (Zhang, 2009). This 
mechanism is often termed as a Build-Operate and 
Transfer (BOT) form of contract to develop a Public-
Private Partnership (PPP). 
 Construction projects are highly exposed to a variety 
or risks. Moreover, risk plays an important role in 
defining the capital structure of a PF venture. On the one 
hand, PF characterizes itself as a contracting and 
financing mechanism for facilitating equity investments 
into risky projects because it avoids or limits lenders to 
recur for repayment of their loans against the equity 
shareholders (Finnerty, 2007). On the other hand, the 
higher the risk, the lower the debt capacity of a project as 
a result of the reduced ability of a project to match 
financial covenants and, in particular, to meet the target 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). In fact, in high 
risk projects high interest rates are charged and reduced 
amount of loans are offered by lending institutions so 
that a higher target DSCR is assured to minimize the bank’s 
risk-adverse commitment to the project. In other words, the 
amount of risks and the way such risks are being managed 
by the SPV impacts the project’s capital structure, which is 
referred to as the level of equity and debt sources of funds 
required to cover the total initial investment. 
 Overall, the PF/BOT system has been being largely 
used to finance oil and gas infrastructure investments in 
many countries. Oil and gas projects typically require 
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large capitals with rather high level of risk to develop 
either upstream operations facilities, such as oil wells 
and offshore platforms, or downstream operations 
infrastructures, such as gas processing plants, oil 
refineries and pipelines. Oil and gas projects usually 
incur various risks, namely political, financial, revenue, 
construction and operations risks, which are quite similar 
to most risks faced by many types of projects in various 
industries. In addition, a distinctive risk that usually has 
a very high impact on oil and gas projects is the 
environmental risk, due to the inherent nature of 
petroleum operations to impact on the natural and 
human environment. The primary importance of 
environmental risk for oil and gas projects is testified 
by the amount of reported stories of oil spills, coastal 
degradation and communities concerns that often result 
in significant damages and economic losses suffered by 
the vehicle companies. 
 However, the environmental risk is often not given a 
considerable weight in analyzing the risk involved in a 
BOT project, resulting in an underestimation of the 
project’s total riskiness and, in turn, in a potentially 
unbalanced capital structure. 
 A significant stream of literature is in the area of 
risk analysis and, in particular, on the relationship of 
project risk rating with the capital structure of a PF/BOT 
project (Baccarini and Archer, 2001). However, very 
little work seems to address the way that environmental 
risks affect the risk profile of a PF/BOT system 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2002) in order to design an 
appropriate capital structure for an infrastructure 
investment. To overcome this research gap, the purpose 
of this research is to explore the dependence of the 
capital structure of PF/BOT projects on environmental 
risk exposure and to propose a methodology for 
capturing environmental risk into the total risk profile of 
an oil and gas project and estimating its influence on the 
debt leverage.  
 The study is developed as follows. First, we give the 
literature review. Then, we present the methodology, 
followed by its application and validation on two case 
demonstration projects. Finally, we discuss results and 
draw conclusions together with implications and future 
research directions. 
1.1. Literature Review 
 Previous relevant studies to understand the impact of 
environmental risk on the capital structure of PF/BOT oil 
and gas projects can be subsumed into two main 
connected areas of management research. 
 The first research area is related to identifying and 
rating anticipated risks of a PF/BOT project. It is 
commonly accepted in the project management literature 
that risk management is a central process requiring 
identification of various types of risks and assessment of 
the potential consequences and probability of occurrence 
of identified hazards (PMI, 2009; APM, 2004). 
 In particular, for the purpose of this study, the 
identification of risks that might have an impact on the 
financial structure of a PF/BOT infrastructure project is 
of crucial importance (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005) and 
various papers are available to identify the major risk 
categories, such as political, economic, financial, design, 
construction, supply, operating, revenue, force majeure 
and various other risks (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; 
Svanikier, 2008; Marco et al., 2012). Some authors 
explicitly recognize environmental risk as a major source 
of hazard in PPP projects (Zhang, 2005b; Bing et al., 
2005). Iyer and Sagheer (2010) describe environmental 
risks as those due to environmental impact liability, 
public protests and litigation by environmental activists 
that may occur during the construction and operation 
phases of the project. With specific regard to oil and gas 
projects, environmental risk is also referred to as oil and 
gas flaring, water pollution, threats to biodiversity with 
resulting compensation and restoration of livelihoods 
(Davis, 2003; Horta, 2007). From a financial point of 
view, environmental risk in oil and gas projects is seen 
as primarily related to potential changes to 
environmental regulations that could erode the project's 
credit stance and impact on the project cash flow. 
 As stated above, the risk rating of a PF/BOT project 
is a fundamental precursor to design the capital structure 
because it contributes to determining both the debt 
leverage and the interest rates on debt capital. Risk rating 
is usually determined through either qualitative or semi-
quantitative assessment of the combination of the 
probability of occurrence and impact of identified risks 
(PMI, 2009). The qualitative assessment is performed via 
range of nonnumeric notions (i.e., high, medium and low 
likelihood; catastrophic, medium and negligible impact), 
while semi-quantitative analysis can be defined when a 
scale factor is associated to nonnumeric ranking. Some 
researchers propose methods to rate the risk profile of a 
PPP project. Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) 
recommend a score from 1 to 5 for assessing political, 
financial and market risk of BOT projects, with 5 being 
very high risk,. They also provide evidence of the 
relationship between the risk profile and the equity to 
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debt ratio of several projects under consideration. The 
same 1 to 5 scale is used by Baccarini and Archer (2001) 
to rank risk factors affecting project performance. We 
suggest using a 10 to 100 score for risk exposure of a 
project in different risk categories, with 100 being the 
most exposed. Standard and Poor’s 2001 use a 
benchmark score of 1 to riskiest 10 when grading 
projects: generally, projects with score of 1 to 5 are 
investment-grade, while a score of 5 to 10 indicates 
speculative projects. Finally, Zayed et al. (2008) introduce a 
consistent procedure for assessing BOT project risks 
through the definition of a risk index and project ranking 
methodology using the analytic hierarchy process based on 
actual performance of eight main risk areas, i.e., political, 
financial, revenue, promoting, procurement, development, 
construction and operations risks. 
 Although environmental risk is paid attention in the 
risk identification literature, it seems that very little 
consideration is given to environmental risk by both 
scholarly and trade literature when rating the total risk 
profile of a BOT project. Claiming for the need of 
considering environmental risk into risk rating of PPP 
projects, the Equator Principles Financial Institutions 
(EPFIs, 2006) provide principles to ensure that projects 
are developed in a manner that are socially responsible 
and reflect sound environmental management practices and 
propose to rank projects into three categories, namely: (A) 
projects with potential significant adverse environmental 
impacts that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented; (B) 
projects with potential limited adverse environmental 
impacts and (C) projects with minimal or no environmental 
impacts. In conclusion, EPFIs tend to reject loans to A-class 
projects and limit loans to B-class projects. 
 The second pertinent area of management research 
is committed to develop suitable methodologies to 
optimize the PF capital structure and, in particular, to 
define the debt leverage via financial covenants like the 
DSCR. In fact, professional practice and previous 
research have found evidence that the DSCR, which 
reflects the project’s debt carrying ability, is the lender’s 
most sound indicator for establishing the debt leverage 
(Bakatjan et al., 2003). DSCR is referred to as the 
amount of cash flow available to meet annual interest 
and principal payments on debt, including any sinking 
fund payments and it is computed as the ratio between 
operating cash flow and debt service during a one-year 
period (Esty, 2004). Generally, the DSCR should be at 
least equal to or greater than 1.0 to be acceptable, but 
lending agencies actually demand higher and a more 
comfortable target DSCR up to 1.5, according to the 
anticipated risk exposure (Zhang, 2005a). In other words, 
the target DSCR is set at high levels whenever a high 
risk score is assessed for the project. 
 In summary, even though risk is affirmed to be 
central in the definition of the DSCR and, in turn, of the 
optimal capital structure and risk taxonomies are 
provided that contemplate environmental risk, little 
previous work is reported with focus on the influence of 
environmental risk on the PF capital structure. Also, it 
seems that environmental risk is not fully considered in 
the total risk assessment procedure used by lending and 
rating institutions. However, environmental risk might be 
of great impact particularly for oil and gas projects.  
 To overcome this limitation and understand the 
extent to which environmental risk might influence the 
PF capital structure, in the next sections we develop a 
methodology that integrates environmental risk into 
project rating and capital structuring and we provide its 
application and measurement to two oil and gas 
demonstration projects. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 The proposed methodology comprises four main 
steps, namely: (1) identification and semi-quantitative 
rating of the project’s total risk exposure; (2) 
determination of the appropriate interest rate through the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); (3) calculation of 
the DSCR and (4) estimation of project’s debt-to-equity 
ratio. Figure 1 depicts the process flow for determining 
the debt leverage and shows how the computation of the 
DSCR and debt leverage are iterative until the final 
satisfactory debt service ability is obtained.  
2.1. Step 1. Risk Identification and Rating 
 Step Based on models available in the literature to 
classify risks in PPP contracts (Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut 2003; Xenidis and Angelides, 2005; Zhang 
2005b; Iyer and Sagheer, 2010), typical risks inherent 
with oil and gas BOT projects, including environmental 
risk, are identified using a Risk Breakdown Structure 
(RBS) (PMI, 2009), like the one presented in Fig. 2. 
 Identified risks are then assessed their impact of 
consequences and likelihood of occurrence. A 
semiquantitative risk analysis is used by assigning 
numerical scores to nonnumeric definitions of each of 
these constituents, as shown in Table 1 and 2. In 
particular, a scale from 1 to 5 is assigned to the 
probability of risk events and a grading from 1 to 10 is 
applied for evaluating the impact of consequences.  
Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1) (2013) 97-106 
 
100 Science Publications   AJAS 
 
 
Fig. 1. Methodology flow chart 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed risk breakdown structure for an oil and gas BOT project 
 
Table 1. Likelihood scores 
Score Description 
1 Very low-almost never happened in industry 
2 Low-happens rarely 
3 Medium 
4 High-likely to happen 
5 Very high-almost certain to happen 
 
Table 2. Impact scores 
Score Description 
0-2 Insignificant 
3-4 Minor 
5-6 Moderate 
7-8 Major 
9-10 Catastrophic 
Table 3. Risk categories weight without incorporation of 
environmental risk 
Risk category Weight 
Technical (Technology,  
construction and operational) 0.20 
Business (Market and revenue) 0.25 
Financial 0.35 
External 0.20 
 
A committee of experts is recommended to make the 
grading in order to limit subjective preference and 
individual’s judgment (Zayed and Chang, 2002). 
 The weight of each risk category is then determined. 
The weight of a group of risks reflects its importance 
relative to the other categories, irrespective of any 
particular project.  
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Table 4. Risk categories weight with incorporation of environmental risk 
Risk category Weight Description 
Technical 0.17 In petroleum industry it is typical to conduct operations in remote areas and offshore; 
harsh conditions may present great risk despite possible mitigation measures, therefore, the 
weight of this risk group is higher than of Financial risks that are relatively easy to be 
managed, but lower than of Business, External and Environmental. 
Business 0.20 Business risk group which comprise P reinvestment and Market risks has a higher eight 
than Financial and Technical risk groups, because of the peculiarity of the industry: high 
volatility of prices and commodity risk. An approximate cost of conducting a 3D seismic 
survey is millions of dollars, yet it does not guarantee the presence of oil for 100%. 
Financial 0.13 Financial markets have learnt to manage such risks better than others; therefore, the weight 
is the lowest. 
Environmental 0.30 Each step of petroleum operations have an adverse effect on environment, therefore,  
/Social  the importance of this risk group is the highest relative to other groups. 
Environmental 0.5  
Accidental  0.3  Accidental risks have greater impact than cumulative when they occur, but people are 
aware of such risks and are able to manage them. 
Cumulative 0.7 Cumulative risks occurrence is almost certain; their impact is observed in long-term, 
usually not taken seriously. 
Social 0.5  
External  0.20  Force majeure risks cannot be managed by any party, politics play a significant role in 
petroleum industry and thus the weight is the same as for Business risk group. 
 
In general, the choice of the risk weight is quite subjective 
and relies on the principle that the better the hedging 
methods available for avoiding or mitigating the effects of a 
certain risk in the market/industry, the lower their influence 
on the risk profile yielding in a lower relative weight. With 
this principle in mind and based on practices from 
international rating agencies we propose a weighing system 
for identified risk categories experienced in oil and gas 
BOT projects (Table 3). 
 This weighing method does not consider 
environmental risks. To overcome this limitation and 
adjust the weights to the suggested RBS presented in 
Figure 2, we propose a derivative weighing system, 
which incorporates environmental risks. The complete 
weighing system is presented in Table 4 with 
justification of relative weight assigned to each category.  
 The two case scenarios, namely (a) with 
incorporation of environmental risk and (b) without 
considering environmental risk, can now be compared. 
The computation of the project’s exposure to all risks, 
i.e.: the project risk s, is proposed as follows. 
 The exposure neiR of any group of risks, except for the 
environmental group, is calculated through Equation 1: 
 
ne
iR L * I  (1) 
 
 Regarding the risk exposure of the environmental 
risk group eiR , a modified Equation 2 is used it to 
account for the community risk perception, which 
weighs the impact factor more than the likelihood 
(Carpignano et al., 2009): 
e k
iR L * I  (2) 
 
where, k>1; for instance, in more community-sensitive 
countries k might equal 2.0 to stress the importance of 
the adverse impact of risk. 
 Burgman (2005) states that risk can be 
underestimated by the risk proponents and overestimated 
by those dealing with the consequences. Nevertheless, 
the degradation of ecosystems due to petroleum operations 
is taking place on a global scale and environmental 
awareness is arising, thus increasing community’s 
susceptibility to possible adverse effects. This is why it is 
proposed to weigh the impact from environmental risk 
more than impacts from other risk groups. 
 For the sake of simplicity, only the first level risks 
of the RBS are being considered, except for the 
environmental risks, where both second and third levels 
are taken into account (Table 4). 
 Finally, the total risk rating R of the project is 
computed as the summation of each risk group exposure 
Ri times the correspondent weight Wi, as given in 
Equation 3: 
 
i iR R * W   (3) 
2.2. Step 2. Interest Rate Calculation 
 There are a number of factors that might affect the 
interest rate on loans for a PPP project. Firstly, interest 
rates are strongly influenced by the overall condition of a 
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country’s economy. When the economy is growing, the 
consumers’ demand for goods increases leading to 
increase in demand for funds and interest rate rise and 
viceversa. Inflation also affects interest rates to 
compensate lenders for the decreased future value of 
money. Taxes may also be a reason for higher rates 
because some of the gains from interest may be subject 
to taxes and the lender may insist on a higher rate to 
make up for this loss. As anticipated earlier into this 
study, another factor affecting interest rates is the risk 
profile of the project: the riskier the project, the higher 
the rate offered by lending institutions. To prove this 
relationship the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is 
applied in our methodology. Some important 
assumptions are made prior using the model.  
 First of all, theoretically, CAPM is used when 
defining the cost of capital of a firm, not a single project. 
Application of CAPM in calculating the interest rate 
offered for a project could be justified by the fact that, as 
the analyzed projects were financed by means of PF, 
they were developed by SPV companies created 
exclusively for the purpose of this project. Thus, the 
CAPM in PF could be used directly to identify the 
expected rate of return of a project. 
 The CAPM states that the equilibrium rate of return 
of an asset, or a project, is function of the relative risk 
level when compared to the market portfolio and can be 
computed with Equation 4: 
 
i f i m fE(r ) r *[E(r ) r ]     (4) 
 
where, E(ri) is the expected return of the project; rf the 
risk-free interest rate at the same period, such as a 
government bond or Treasury bill rates; E(rm) the expected 
return of the market, with the S&P500 index widely used as 
a benchmark; [E(rm)-rf] the excess rate of return on the 
market portfolio; the product ßi* [E(rm)-rf] indicates the risk 
premium; and βi the systematic risk of the project. In 
classical theory, an asset that has β > 1 is more sensitive to 
market movements than the market portfolio, thus more 
risky and should provide greater returns than the expected 
return on the market portfolio. Similarly, an asset with β < 1 
is less risky than the market portfolio). 
 Now, because data for extrapolating β of a single 
project are not available, we propose to use Equation 5 to 
calculate the project beta: 
 
R/100 1    (5) 
 
where, R is the overall project risk rating. 
 This formula is used for the purpose of this study 
when analyzing oil and gas projects. As one can 
conclude, oil and gas projects would thus be riskier than 
the overall PPP infrastructure market, as values of beta 
calculated with such formula are be greater than 1.0. 
 Obviously, the calculated values of risk rating affect 
the value of beta, which has, in turn, an impact on the 
debt interest rate; it is expected that greater values of 
beta yield higher interest rate. 
2.3. Step 3. DSCR Calculation 
 After determining the risk exposure and the interest 
rate, it is possible to compute the DSCRy in any one 
single year of operations, using Equation 6: 
 
Y y yDSCR net cash flow / (principal int erest)   (6) 
 
 The amount of debt the project is able to service 
depends on the annual net cash flow generated by the 
project operations, the debt principal to be reimbursed 
and the interest charged by the banks’ pool. The 
minimum DSCR in the worst-case year must be greater 
than the target DSCR imposed by lending institutions. 
The target DSCR is a function of the estimated project’s 
total risk score. 
2.4. Step 4. Estimation of the Debt Leverage 
 Finally, the capital structure is defined according to 
the bank’s requirements of targeting DSCR values. The 
impact of the risk rating on the DSCR occurs in two 
ways: on the one hand, the higher the risk, the greater the 
interest rate offered by the bank and, thus, for a given 
amount of cash flow and debt, lower values of DSCR are 
obtained. On the other hand, as banks are risk averse 
organizations, they tend to increase their target 
requirements on the DSCR in case the debt risk exposure 
is high. Thus, there are low chances of matching the 
required financial covenants. 
 There are two possible solutions when the resulting 
DSCR falls below the target established by the bank as a 
function of the risk assessed. A first solution provides for 
lending institutions to decrease the loan amount, so that 
the capital structure would result in a lower debt-to-
equity ratio. 
 
Table 5. Select parameters for the demonstration projects 
 Project #1  Project #2 
 ----------------------- ----------------------------- 
 Case (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Environmental 40.88 - 70.13 - 
risk exposure 
Project total 54.68 18.1 85.64 21.35 
risk rating 
Annual 8.15% 7.24% 8.92% 7.32% 
interest rate 
Minimum DSCR 4.21 4.22 1.29 2.11 
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Table 6. Project#1 cash flow data 
Debt 
thous. 1,450,000 
USD 
Cash  
flow 
thous. 317,481 384,765 389,154 366,575 401,552 398,211 433,477 435,267 438,118 373,182 371,469 378,471 387,428 328,978 358,441 391,545 383,528 382,868 327,531 308,024 
USD 
Case a)  
year   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
principal ($71, ($71, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($73, ($73, 
 940) 999) 058) 116) 175) 234) 293) 352) 411) 470) 529) 588) 647) 706) 766) 825) 884) 944) 003) 063) 
Interest ($1,182) ($1,123) ($1,065) ($1,006) ($947) ($888) ($829) ($770) ($711) ($652) ($593) ($534) ($475) ($416) ($357) ($297) ($238) ($179) ($119) ($60) 
Σ ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73,  ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, 
 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 122) 
DSCR (4.34) (5.26) (5.32) (5.01) (5.49) (5.45) (5.93) (5.95) (5.99) (5.10) (5.08) (5.18) (5.30) (4.50) (4.90) (5.35) (5.25) (5.24) (4.48) (4.21) 
Case b) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
principal ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($72, ($73, 
 003) 055) 107) 159) 211) 264) 316) 368) 421) 473) 526) 578) 631) 683) 736) 789) 841) 894) 947) 000) 
Interest ($1,050) ($998) ($946) ($893) ($841) ($789) ($737) ($684) ($632) ($579) ($527) ($474) ($422) ($369) ($317) ($264) ($211) ($158) ($106) ($53) 
Σ ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, ($73, 
 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 052) 
DSCR (4.35) (5.27) (5.33) (5.02) (5.50) (5.45) (5.93) (5.96) (6.00) (5.11) (5.08) (5.18) (5.30) (4.50) (4.91) (5.36) (5.25) (5.24) (4.48) (4.22) 
 
Table 7. Project #2 cash flow data 
Debt 
thous.  1,400,000 
USD 
Cash  
flow 
thous. 433,000 894,000 1,007,000 1,002,000 1,024,000 1,019,000 826,000 642,000 470,000 376,000 324,000 281,000 244,000 212,000 
USD 
Case a) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Principal ($54,109) ($58,937) ($64,195) ($69,923) ($76,162) ($82,957) ($90,359) ($98,421) ($107,202) ($116,767) ($127,185) ($138,533) ($150,894) ($164,357) 
Interest ($1,249) ($1,160) ($1,072) ($983) ($894) ($805) ($716) ($627) ($537) ($448) ($358) ($269) ($179) ($90) 
Σ ($55,358) ($60,097) ($65,267) ($70,906) ($77,055) ($83,762) ($91,074) ($99,047) ($107,739) ($117,215) ($127,544) ($138,802) ($151,073) ($164,447) 
DSCR (7.82) (14.88) (15.43) (14.13) (13.29) (12.17) (9.07) (6.48) (4.36) (3.21) (2.54) (2.02) (1.62) (1.29) 
Case b) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Principal ($99,525) ($99,598) ($99,671) ($99,744) ($99,817) ($99,890) ($99,963) ($100,036) ($100,109) ($100,183) ($100,256) ($100,329) ($100,403)  ($100,476) 
Interest ($1,025) ($952) ($879) ($806) ($733) ($660) ($587) ($514) ($441) ($367) ($294) ($221) ($147) ($74) 
Σ ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) ($100,550) 
DSCR (4.31) (8.89) (10.01) (9.97) (10.18) (10.13) (8.21) (6.38) (4.67) (3.74) (3.22) (2.79) (2.43) (2.11) 
 
However, the SPV’s sponsors usually seek to maximize 
the debt leverage of the project in order to minimize their 
equity participation in the project and associated risk, to 
maximize the internal rate of return to equity and to allocate 
limited money in multiple projects (Zhang, 2005b). Thus, a 
second option suggests that project promoters take 
preventive risk mitigating actions to lower the risk exposure 
of the project in order to obtain less interest rate and to take 
advantage of larger loan amounts. 
2.5. Application 
 For the purpose of validating and proving the 
viability of the proposed methodology, we apply it to 
two oil and gas BOT projects, whose names and location 
cannot be disclosed for confidentiality reasons. The 
projects under consideration are real past ventures used 
here as a demonstration. Project #1 comprises design, 
construction and operations of an oil field development, 
a pipeline system and downstream facilities. 
Environmental risks borne by Project #1 are mainly air 
emissions and oil spills; these are amplified by the 
specific properties of the hydrocarbons such as high 
concentration of sulphur and metals, particularly nickel 
and vanadium. Their processing implies a coke and 
sulphur generation, as well as a large amount of effluents 
and emissions to the atmosphere. Pipelines are laid under 
the sea, thus, discharges of oil and chemicals have 
various lethal and non-lethal effects on maritime 
wildlife. Moreover, the onshore part of the pipeline is 
laid underground which demands for a considerable 
earth disruption. 
 Project #2 consists of two components: a field 
system comprising drilling of wells to extract oil, a 
treatment facility to upgrade oil, an operating center for 
production support; and an export system which entails a 
pipeline from the oil fields to a floating storage, an 
offloading vessel located offshore and a monitoring 
system to detect potential oil leaks. Project #2 is 
executed in a sensitive area consisting of a number of 
rivers, habitat zones where rare plants and endangered 
species live and a delicate marine environment; 
moreover, the pipeline crosses a huge littoral forest zone. 
Thus, environmental risks such as oil spills, deforestation 
and degradation of coastal reef are encountered by the 
construction and operations activities; air pollution is 
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also a concern. It must be noted that the probability of 
these risks to occur and, consequently, the possible impact 
on the environment and people, is very high and in some 
cases almost inevitable due to the peculiarities of politics 
and attitude of different parties executing the project. 
 It is expected that higher risk exposure would lead to 
lower minimum DSCR, all other components remaining 
equal. This would indicate the inability of a project to 
service its debt in case the minimum DSCR falls below 
the target DSCR imposed by the bank. 
 Cash flow data used for DSCR computations of both 
projects are reported in Table 6 and 7. 
3. RESULTS 
 Table 5 is a summary report of the two projects’ 
risk score, annual interest rate and minimum DSCR 
figures. We calculated all parameters using the steps of 
the proposed methodology and under both case scenarios 
above, namely: (a) with environmental risk rating; (b) 
without considering environmental risk. 
 For both projects, an increased case (a) risk rating 
than case (b) is due to the incorporation of environmental 
risks into the risk assessment, which, theoretically, 
affects the capital structure of the project. However, a 
different impact of environmental risk exposure on the 
two proposed projects results in differing influence on 
the minimum DSCR. For project #1, which bears a low 
level of environmental risk exposure, the difference is 
insignificant and clearly does not increase the interest 
charged and, in turn, does not affect the capital structure 
of the project. 
 For Project #2, the difference in minimum DSCR 
between the two cases is due to a high environmental 
risk exposure of the project. In particular, the project 
fails to meet a typical 1.5 target DSCR when 
environmental risk is added, while without the effect of 
environmental considerations the project cash flow is 
largely capable to bear the expected debt. Therefore, a 
lower debt-to-equity ratio must be determined. 
 In summary, the debt service ability of each project 
depends on the level of risk exposure borne by 
associated performed construction and operations: here, 
project #2 has much greater potential effect on the 
environment than project #1. For the same values of cash 
flow and debt, the minimum DSCR decreases with 
increased risk exposure. The main reason is the increase 
in the interest rate, which in turn is the indicator of a 
bank’s willingness to provide financing to risky projects: 
the higher the risk, the higher the expected return. Also, 
if risk is not mitigated and the total risk profile is not 
improved, the debt leverage is likely to be reduced, thus 
leading to a higher equity level. 
 The methodology poses some limitations inherent 
with its domain of application and level of profitability. 
As stated above, environmental risk is not just the only 
factor influencing the DSCR. Therefore, the advantages 
of the proposed methodology are maximized when it is 
applied to those sectors and projects characterized by 
high environmental risks. In such cases, the difference in 
total risk exposure would be more significant and so 
would be its impact on the DSCR. 
 Also, projects with non-maximized debt leverage 
may be insensitive to variations in the DSCR and, 
therefore, insensible to environmental risk exposure. For 
instance, project #1 expects to generate cash flows high 
enough to service even greater debt than established, so 
that a reduced minimum DSCR does not have much 
impact on the financial structure. 
4. DISCUSSION 
 The preventive actions conducted to mitigate the 
environmental risk exposure are likely to affect the 
project’s capital structure in two ways. On the one hand, 
a lower environmental risk contributes to reducing the 
overall risk score of the project with subsequent reduced 
interest, higher minimum DSCR, lower target DSCR 
and, in turn, higher debt leverage and reduced equity 
contribution to the total investment. 
 On the other hand, the costs of risk mitigating 
actions undertaken during the design and construction 
periods result in an increased initial investment either 
through increased equity, which leads to lower debt-to 
equity ratio, or by acquiring more debt, if the project 
cash flow and minimum DSCR can justify. 
 Improved risk mitigation actions include, but are not 
limited to, implementation of more advanced 
technologies, systems and processes that might lead to 
less negative impact on the environment and improved 
safety. However, because huge research and 
development (R&D) efforts are usually required in 
relation to such advancement in risk-preventive 
technologies and because lending institutions are 
disinclined to finance risky and unprofitable R&D 
spending for environmental risk mitigating measures, it 
may be concluded that oil and gas companies have to 
fund the development of advanced environmental 
technologies with owned equity sources. 
 At a first glance, such scenario might seem 
unattractive to oil and gas players. Companies are 
reluctant to invest much equity in the project due to the 
reasons discussed above.  
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 However, the situation is changing. Besides 
traditional consequences from environmental risks such 
as increased operating costs and penalties, many 
emerging social and environmental pressures associated 
with requirements on greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction, boicott campaigns and opposition by 
environmentalists, are likely to increasingly affect oil 
and gas shareholders’ value, project risk management 
policies and BOT/PF options (Wright and 
Rwabizambuga, 2006). Moreover, the ever increasing 
significance of the health, safety and environment 
management systems has been leading oil and gas 
contractors to place the implementation of such systems in 
their agenda. Therefore, both investing equity resources to 
sustain R&D investments to mitigate environmental risk 
and accounting for the impact of environmental risk into 
the project total risk rating are necessary trends to 
facilitate an appropriate debt leverage into BOT/PF oil and 
gas projects. The proposed methodology can help oil and 
gas companies in this process. 
 This study also promises applicability to other 
sectors and might be beneficially used as a template for 
an investigation in other infrastructure projects that are, 
to some extents, exposed to high environmental risks. To 
this end, future research should extend the validity of the 
methodology beyond the oil and gas context and 
generalize its results for diffused usage by lending 
institutions and concessionaires. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 In the current practice the share of environmental 
risks in the assessment of the total risk profile of an oil 
and gas BOT/PF project is often underestimated. 
However, environmental risks pose a significant threat to 
the project financial viability. Thus, environmental risks 
must be given an appropriate weight when defining the 
risk profile of a project. To this end, this study proposes 
a methodology for incorporating environmental risks into 
the project total risk rating and for refining the process to 
determine the capital structure of a BOT/PF investment. 
 Through application to two case studies, it has been 
shown that higher values of risk exposure due to 
environmental risks lead to increased interest rates 
offered by lending institutions, decreased debt service 
ability of the project’s cash flows and, as a result, a 
lower debt leverage. It is also shown that low levered 
projects may be not affected by variations of the risk 
score due to high environmental risk exposure. However, 
because of reduced equity availability, the capital 
structure of BOT/PF projects tends to maximize the debt 
leverage and, consequently, be highly exposed to the 
consequences of environmental risks. 
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